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Brian Wilson*

If it's Reusable Why not Reuse it?
The Reuse of Single Use Medical
Devices

The reprocessing and subsequent reuse of medical devices labelled by the
manufacturer as 'single-use only' is a cost cutting strategy employed by many
healthcare centres. However, attempting to extend the life of a device labelled
as 'single-use only' raises a number of unique concerns surrounding the issue of
legal liability specifically who should bear responsibility if someone suffers harm
as a result of a reprocessed single-use device. Following an overview of the
current regulatory environment, the potential tortious liability attaching to those
who may be implicated in the reprocessing chain is discussed. Specifically, this
paper examines the duty and standard ofcare owed by regulatory bodies, original
manufacturers, third-party reprocessors, healthcare facilities and care providers
in the reuse of devices labelled as 'single-use only'. Finally, by drawing on various
international practices the paper concludes by advocating for regulatory reform
to better provide proactive oversight in the area of reuse in Canada.
Le retraitement et la rdutilisation de dispositifs mddicaux 6tiquetds par leurs
fabricants comme 6tant j usage unique sont une strat~gie de rdduction des coats
, laquelle ont recours de nombreux centres de soins de sant6. Cependant, une
tentative de prolonger le cycle de vie d'un dispositif destind &n'dtre utilis6 qu'une
seule fois soul~ve un certain nombre de prdoccupations quant j la responsabilit6
Idgale, plus particulibrement, qui est responsable si un patient subit un prdjudice
en consequence de la rdutilisation d'un dispositif mddical J usage unique
retransformd? Aprbs avoir donnd un apergu du contexte r6glementaire actuel,
lauteur discute de la responsabilit6 d6lictuelle potentielle qui incombe aux
acteurs de la charne de retraitement. Plus pr6cisement, Iarticle traite du devoir
et de la norme de diligence des organismes de r~glementation, des fabricants,
des tiers qui proc~dent au retraitement, des dtablissements de soins de sant6
et des fournisseurs de soins dans la rdutilisation des dispositifs 6 usage unique.
Enfin, s'inspirant de diverses pratiques qui ont cours &l'dtranger Iauteurconclut
par un plaidoyer pour une r6forme de la reglementation afin que le secteur de la
rdutilisation au Canada soit mieux surveill6.

The author is currently completing his articles at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP. He expresses
many thanks to Professor Elaine Gibson of the Dalhousie Health Law Institute for her help and
guidance with this paper.
*

230

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I.
The current regulatory environment
II. Legal consequences of reuse
1. Government regulator
2.
Originalmanufacturer
3. Third-party reprocessors
4. Hospitals
5. Physicians
III. The internationalregulatory environment
1. United States
2. Australia
3. United Kingdom
4. European Union
IV. A recommended approach
1. Option one: maintain the status quo-encourageprovinces and
territoriesto develop their own regulatory solutions
2. Option two: attempt to ban the reuse of all single-use devices
all together
3. Option three: amend the Medical Devices Regulations to
include the activities of reprocessors
Conclusion

Introduction
The longstanding practice of reusing certain medical devices has
received increased attention over the past decade. The concern stems
from a phenomenon that originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s
with the advent of the single-use medical device (SUD).' During that
time manufacturers began to produce an increasing number of SUDs in
response to consumer demand and the availability of new synthetic (e.g.
plastics) technology.2 Since then the reprocessing process has grown to
include many medical devices marketed as "disposable" or "single use"

1. Health Canada, Issue Analysis Summary: The Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices (Ottawa:
Therapeutic Products Directorate, 2005), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.caldhp-mps/alt formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/md-imi/saprmdiasgcsrmm-ra_2005-06-09-eng.pdf>.
2.
Martin S Favero, "Requiem for Reuse of Single-Use Devices in US hospitals" (2001) 22 Infect
Control Hosp Epidemiol 539.
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only. Table one provides a list of some of the most frequently reprocessed
items identified as single-use only.'
SUD

HOSPITAL DEPARTMENT
Anaesthesiology

Ventilator circuits

Gastroenterology

Biopsy forceps

Orthopaedics

Blades and Drill bits

Obstetrics/ Gynaecology

Breast Pump kit
Vaginal speculums

Cardiology

Angioplasty balloon catheters

Miscellaneous (general instruments)

Oral Airways
Clamps
ET Tubes

Table 1. Single-use medical devicesfrequently reprocessed

Given the lack of recognized data on the safety and effectiveness
of reuse, it is not surprising that the reprocessing of SUDs has sparked
much debate.' Further, this activity seems to be taking place in spite of
manufacturers' label instructions warning against reuse, without consistent
direction from professional associations or other healthcare stakeholders
and in the absence of clear regulatory guidance.s This provides for little
consistency between neighbouring hospitals, let alone a provincial or
national standard.
Since 1986 three surveys have been conducted on the reuse of SUDs by
Canadian acute-care facilities. 6The most recent study, completed in 2008,
found wide-spread reuse in a significant number of Canadian hospitals.
Of 398 hospitals surveyed 28 per cent admitted to reusing SUDs. While
some of the reprocessing was contracted out to licensed reprocessors, 85

3.
Health Canada, Medical Devices Repmcessing Concerns and Recommendations (Ottawa:
Scientific Advisory Panel on Reprocessing of Medical Devices, October 2006), online: <http://www.
hc-sc.gc.caldhp-mps/alt formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/md-im/saprmdtable gcsrmmtableau_2006-1012-13-eng.pdf>; See also David Hailey et al, "Reprocessing of single-use medical devices: Clinical,
economic, and health services impact" (Ottawa: Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in
Health, 2008).
4.
US, General Accounting Office, Single-Use Medical Devices: Little AvailableEvidence ofHarm
from Reuse, but Oversight Warranted (2000), online: General Accounting Office <http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/he00123.pdf>.
5.
Canadian Healthcare Association, The Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices: Guidelinesfor
Healthcare Facilities(Ottawa: CHA Press, 1996) at 9-10.
6.
BA Campbell et al, "Reuse of Disposable Medical Devices in Canadian Hospitals" (1987) 15
Am J Infect Control 196; MA Miller, D Gravel & S Paton, "Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices in
Canadian Acute-Care Healthcare Facilities" (2001) 27:23 Can Commun Dis Rep 193; J Polisena et al,
"Reprocessing of Single-Use Medical Devices: National Survey of Canadian Acute-Care Hospitals"
(Ottawa: Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health, 2008).
7.
Polisena, ibid at 4.
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per cent of the hospitals who admitted to reprocessing said that they did
the work themselves.' Among the hospitals practicing reprocessing, 40
per cent self-reported that they do not have written protocols in place for
reuse, or any way of determining the number of times that the item has
been reused.9
While all medical devices pose risks of harm from defects in
manufacturing or improper use, the reprocessing of SUDs raises a number
of unique concerns. Specifically, who should bear responsibility if someone
suffers harm as a result of a reprocessed SUD?
The practice of reusing SUDs is cause for concern for healthcare
facilities as well as a host of other entities: the regulatory body responsible
for the control and management of SUDs, the original manufacturer of the
device, any third-party reprocessors of the device, and the care provider
who treats the patient. Given the level of reuse activity that has reportedly
occurred, and continues to occur, it seems appropriate to consider the legal
implications of reuse as it relates to all those involved in the reprocessing
chain. Following an overview of the current regulatory framework in
Canada, this paper will discuss the potential tortious liability of each entity.
More specifically, the focus of this paper will be to examine the 'duty' and
the 'standard of care' owed to patients by each of the entities involved in
reprocessing. The paper concludes by drawing on current practices from
around the world to suggest a regulatory framework to augment the tort
system-a solution that aims to provide clarity, guidance and certainty in
the area of reuse in Canada.
I. The current regulatory environment
The starting point for any discussion on medical device use in Canada is
the Medical Devices Regulations'o made pursuant to Canada's Food and
Drugs Act." These statutory instruments prescribe the legal requirements
for manufacturers of medical devices and regulate the sale, importation
and advertising of these products. Health Canada is responsible for the
administration and oversight of the FDA.' 2 The Bureau of Medical Devices
is a directorate of Health Canada's Health Protection Branch and is the
principal guardian of the Medical Devices Regulations. Its mandate is the
8.

Ibid at 7.
Ibidat 6.
10. Medical Devices Regulations, SOR/98-282.
I. Foodand Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27.
12. DepartmentofNational Healthand Welfare Act, RSC 1985, c N- 10, as repealed by SC 2006, c 11,
s 105. In 1996 the government enacted the Department of Health Act which replaced the Department
of National Health and Welfare Act and gave rise to the Department of Health (Health Canada) in its
current form. See Department of Health Act, RSC 1996, c 8 H-3.2, s 2.

9.
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pre-market investigation, monitoring, approval, testing, and regulation of
medical devices, including those imported into Canada. A manufacturer is
defined in s. I of the Regulations as:
...a person who sells a medical device under their own name, or under a
trade-mark, design, trade name or other name or mark owned or controlled
by the person, and who is responsible for designing, manufacturing,
assembling, processing, labelling, packaging, refurbishing or modifying
the device, or for assigning to it a purpose, whether those tasks are
performed by that person or on their behalf."
Although cleaning and sterilizing devices may be considered a
manufacturing activity, merely carrying out the activity does not make
the agent a manufacturer within the meaning of the Regulations.The FDA
and its Regulations do not lay down requirements on the user of the device
since the Regulations apply only where the device is sold. Section 2 of the
Regulations reads:
These Regulations apply to
(a) the sale and advertising for sale of a medical device; and
(b) the importation of a medical device for sale or for use on individuals,
other than importation for personal use. 4
Many consumers assume that since the Regulations require manufacturers
to provide adequate instructions and warnings for the safe use of their
products; that users, in turn, are required to follow those instructions. That
is not the case. The FDA and its Regulations are silent on the use of a
device contrary to a manufacturer's instructions.
The Medical Devices Bureau of Health Canada has taken the position
that hospitals are not device manufacturers within the meaning of the
Regulations. This is because hospitals engaged in reuse activity do not
sell or distribute devices under their own name or trademark.I If hospitals
are not manufacturers, then it follows that healthcare facilities which use,
maintain and sterilize medical devices are not governed by the Regulations.
The application of the Regulations is, however, less clear where a third
party for compensation reprocesses devices belonging to a hospital and
then returns them to that facility for reuse.

13. Supra note 10, s 1.
14. Supra note 10, s 2.
15. Health Canada, Update on Reprocessing and Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices, (Ottawa:
Therapeutic Products Directorate, 2007), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.caldhp-mps/alt-formats/hpfbdgpsa/pef/md-im/1thsud mdlahimjim-eng.pdf>.
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In 2005, the National Scientific Advisory Panel on Reprocessing
of Medical Devices [Advisory Panel] made recommendations to
Health Canada, one of which was to undertake the regulation of SUD
reprocessing.'" The Advisory Panel also provided a list of criteria for
device design and materials which could be used to judge the safety of
reprocessing particular devices. Health Canada responded by stating that
it did not have the authority to regulate the use of medical devices in a
clinical environment and, by extension, the reuse of disposables, on the
basis that the Medical Devices Regulations do not apply to the use of a
device after its sale.' 7
Health Canada asserts that the use and reuse of medical devices is to
be controlled by provincial laws and medical licensing bodies pursuant to
provincial powers. Constitutionally, provincial jurisdiction over healthcare
within a province exists through the provinces general authority over
"matters of a local and private nature" in s. 92(16) of the ConstitutionAct,
1867, and over the "management of hospitals" in s. 92(7).1 Health Canada
finds support for its reluctance to champion this issue in section 12 of the
Department ofHealth Act which reads:
Nothing in this Act or the regulations authorizes the Minister or any
officer or employee of the Department to exercise any jurisdiction
or control over any health authority operating under the laws of any
province. 9
Thus Health Canada cannot operate within the sphere of provincially
mandated services, such as delivery of health care, operation of hospitals,
or regulation of the health care professions. The duties of the federal
Health Minister, set out in s. 4 (1), are limited to "all matters over which
Parliament has jurisdiction relating to the promotion and preservation
of the health of the people of Canada not by law assigned to any other
department, board or agency of the Government of Canada."20 Although
the delivery of healthcare and the establishment of policies and standards
with respect to patient care have traditionally been the responsibility of
provincial and territorial health ministers, few of the provinces have yet to
enact any legislation affecting the reuse of SUDs.
16. Health Canada, Scientific Advisory Panel on Reprocessing of Medical Devices, Record of
Proceedings, (Ottawa: Therapeutic Products Directorate, 2005), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.cal
dhp-mps/md-im/activit/sci-consult/reproc-retraite/saprmd rop gcsrmmcrd 2005-02-10-eng.php>
[Advisory Panel].
17. Supra note 15.
18. Ibid.
19. Departmentof Health Act, SC 1996, c 8, s 12.
20. Ibidats4(l).
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Quebec
In 1993, the Conseil d'6valuation des technologies de la sante du
Quebec published guidelines advising that the reuse of cardiac catheters,
pacemakers and hemodializers did not pose unacceptable risks to patients
provided that hospitals had adequate procedures in place to assure quality
reuse.2 ' However, in 1997 the Qudbec Minister of Health and Social
Services updated its position by not allowing the reuse of some devices
(e.g. cardiac catheters) if the original use was in patients considered
vectors for disease transmission. 22
Manitoba
In February 1998, Manitoba banned the reuse of critical care disposables
in health care facilities. 23
Northwest Territories
In 2005, the Northwest Territories revised its Hospital and Health Care
Facility Standards Regulations to require that "a disposable device
intended to be used on a patient during a single procedure shall not be used
on a patient for more than one procedure and shall not be used on another
patient." 24 This is the only province or territory to issue a blanket ban on
the reuse of all SUDs in Canada.
Ontario
Ontario has issued the most robust set of guidelines. In 2006, the Ontario
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care endorsed a guidance document
developed by its Provincial Infectious Disease Advisory Committee
(PIDAC). Ontario Best Practice Guidelines state that critical and semicritical medical equipment or devices labelled as single-use must not
be reprocessed and reused unless the reprocessing is done by a licensed
reprocessor. The Ontario guidelines also suggest that some items like
needles should never be reprocessed while they strongly recommend that
other devices with small lumens (e.g. catheters) be single-use only. In an
effort to manage any legal risk inherent with reuse, the guidelines suggest

21. Conseil d'6valuation des technologies de la sant6 du Quebec (CETS), "The reuse of single-use
catheters" by Roger Jacob & Patricia Bentolia (Montreal: The Conseil, 1993).
22. Conseil d'6valuation des technologies de la sant6 du Qu6bec (CETS), Report CETS 9704
RE, "The reuse of single-use catheter and the risk of transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: an
update-non-systematic review" (Montreal: The Conseil, 1997).
23. Supra note 15.
24. Hospitaland Health Care Facility StandardsRegulations, NWT Reg 036-2005, s 62.
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initiating "written policies, extensive testing of reprocessing protocols and
strict adherence to quality assurance investigations."25
British Columbia
British Columbia has a policy that as of January 1, 2008 all health
authorities must eliminate the reprocessing and reuse of critical contact
single-use devices unless they have been reprocessed by a licensed thirdparty reprocessor, certified by a national regulatory authority such as
Health Canada or the US Food and Drug Administration.2 6
Alberta
In 2008, Alberta issued a set of standards for single-use medical devices in
which it adopted much of the same language and protocols as the Ontario

guidelines. 27
Other federal and provincial stakeholders have also weighed in on
the issue of reprocessing SUDs. The Canadian Healthcare Association
published The Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices: Guidelines for
Healthcare Facilitiesin 1996, which addresses the key issues regarding
single-use device reuse-cleaning and sterilization protocols, cost
justification, liability costs and the patient's right to information.2 8 It does
not take a position for or against reuse of SUDs, but provides a framework
to enable a facility to judge the merits of reuse, and to establish the quality
systems necessary to ensure that reprocessed SUDs are safe. In spite of
this guidance, in 2008, a Health Canada-sponsored study found that 40 per
cent of the hospitals reusing SUDs did not have a system in place to track
usage.2 9
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear regulatory mandate to oversee
reprocessing and reuse activity within hospitals, Health Canada continues
to face pressure from device manufacturers, hospitals and other healthcare
stakeholders to take action to standardize policies on reuse across Canada.

25. Ontario, Provincial Infectious Diseases Advisory Committee (PIDAC), Best Practices for
Cleaning, Disinfection, and Sterilization (Infection Prevention and Control Subcommittee, 2006),
online:
<http://www.health.gov.bc.callibrary/publications/year/2007/BPGuidelinesCleaning
Disinfection Sterilization MedicalDevices.pdf>.
26. British Columbia, Ministry of Health Policy Communiqu6, Reprocessing of Medical Devices
and Patient Care Equipment (June 2007).
27. Alberta, Standardsfor Single-Use Medical Devices (16 January 2008), online: <http://www.
health.alberta.caldocuments/IPC-Medical-Device-Cleaning-2008.pdf>. Note: Since this paper was
accepted for publication Alberta amended its standards for SUDs providing that critical and semicritical medical devices shall not be used.
28. Canadian Healthcare Association, The Reuse of Single-Use Medical Devices: Guidelinesfor
HealthcareFacilities,(Ottawa: CHA Press, 1996).
29. Polisena, supra note 6 at 6.
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II. Legal consequences of reuse
There has yet to be a reported Canadian case on the reuse of SUDs in
Canada. While we wait for the definitive word on the tortious liability
attaching to reuse activities, the jurisprudence to date does provide insight
into the potential liability of regulatory bodies, manufacturers, third-party
reprocessors, hospitals and healthcare professions. Figure one represents
the path an SUD takes in the reprocessing process and, in turn, provides a
visual which helps us to understand how various actors are connected to a
liability claim relating to SUD reprocessing.
The discussion in this paper will be confined, in the main, to the
primary basis of liability-negligence. Specifically, the potential duty and
standard of care attaching itself to the following actors will be examined:
(a) government regulator; (b) original manufacturer; (c) third-party
reprocessor; (d) healthcare facility; and (e) physicians.

Odgid-pI

Figure 1. The Path of a Reprocessed Single-Use Device

The first question to consider in an action for negligence is whether
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. In determining whether a
duty of care exists the court will apply the two-step Anns test as adopted
by the Supreme Court in Kamloops v. Nielsen.30 The first step focuses on
the relationship between the parties. It asks whether the relationship is
of sufficient proximity so that the harm that occurred was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act.' A relationship of
proximity was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hercules
Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, as one "of such a nature that the
defendant may be said to be under an obligation to be mindful of the

30. City of Kamloops v Jan Clemmensen Nielsen et al, [1984] 2 SCR 2 at 10-11.
31. Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (HL) at 580-581; see also Cooper v Hobart 2001 SCC
79, [2001] 3 SCR 537 at para 24.
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plaintiff's legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs."3 2 In
Cooper v. Hobart, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. stated that determining
the closeness of a relationship may involve "looking at expectations,
representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved.""
These factors help inform whether "it is just and fair having regard to that
relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the defendant."34
The second question is whether the imposition of a duty should
be moderated or negated by any policy concerns.35 This stage is not
concerned with the relationship between the parties, but rather the effect of
recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system and
society more generally.36 Finally, if a plaintiff is able to establish that the
defendant owes them a duty of care, the plaintiff must then demonstrate
that the defendant has breached the standard of care. A defendant's conduct
breaches this standard if it creates an unreasonable risk of harm. 7
1. Government regulator
The parameters of government liability for regulatory negligence continue
to evolve. We have moved from a system of complete Crown immunity to
one where a government may be held liable in tort." But while a duty of
care is almost always presumed to exist between a hospital and patient (or
physician and patient), in the case of a regulatory body, any potential duty
of care must be considered within its statutory context.39 We begin with a
survey of the liability of the Crown in tort actions generally.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered a regulator's duty of care
to the consumer in Edwards v. The Law Society of Upper Canada.40 In
Edwards, the issue was whether the Law Society of Upper Canada (the
regulatory body) owed a duty of care to persons who deposit money into
a solicitor's trust account. The Supreme Court held that the Law Society
owed a duty to the public as a whole, and had an obligation to discharge
its mandate having regard for the public's interest. However, no private
law duty existed to members of the public who dealt with organizations
or persons whose conduct was overseen by the regulator as there was no
proximate relationship.4 1
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Hercules Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165 at para 24.
Cooper, supra note 3 1 at para 34.
Ibid
Ibid at para 37; see generally Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1978] AC 728 (HL).
Cooper, ibidat para 37.
Mustapha v Culligan of CanadaLtd, 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114 at para 7.
Crown Liability and ProceedingsAct, RSC 1985, c C-50, s 2(b).
Cooper,supra note 31 at para 43.
Edwards v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2001 SCC 80, [2001] 3 SCR 562.
Ibid at para 14.
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The Federal Court of Canada has also considered the scope of regulator
42
the Court held that the government
liability. In AO Farms Inc v. Canada
does not have a proximate relationship to an individual when it makes
decisions of a political, social or economic nature. Hugessen J. held that:
The relationship between the government and the governed is not one of
individual proximity. Any, perhaps most, government actions are likely
to cause harm to some members of the public. This is why government is
not an easy matter. Of course, the government owes a duty to the public
but it is a duty owed to the public collectively and not individually."3
In Cooper v Hobartthe Supreme Court noted that even if a prima facie
duty of care is found it will be negated where (i) the regulator must make
difficult discretionary decisions in the area of public policy; (ii) where
liability for the damages flowing from the grant of a license or registration
could lead to an indeterminate liability; or (iii) if the imposition of a private
duty of care could result in a huge burden to the taxpayer." The Court's
rationale was that policy is the prerogative of the elected legislature and
it is inappropriate for courts to second guess the government by imposing
liability for the consequences of a particular policy decision.4 5
In the context of medical devices, two decisions from Ontario have
grappled with the notion of a private law duty of care owed by Health
Canada. In Klein v. American Medical Systems Inc., a woman sued the
Federal government on the basis that she suffered harm from a device
that was implanted in her body to alleviate female incontinence.4 6 The
claimant alleged that Health Canada, in accordance with its authority to
regulate medical devices under the FDA and its associated Regulations
was negligent in issuing the manufacturer the license to distribute the
product in Canada. The Ontario Divisional Court held that, "any duties
imposed by the legislation with respect to the regulation of medical devices
by Health Canada are duties owed to the public at large and not to private
individuals."47 Chapnick J., concluding that the lack of a duty was "plain
and obvious,"4 8 commented:
Health Canada is only one player in the complex regulatory and delivery
scheme governing medical devices in Canada. It has no direct role in

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

AO FarmsInc v Canada(2000), 28 Admin LR (3d) 315 (FC).
Ibid at para 11.
Cooper,supra note 31 at paras 52-56.
Ibidat para 38.
Klein v American Medical Systems Inc et al (2006), 84 OR (3d) 217 (Sup Ct J).
Ibidatpara31.
Ibid at para 35.
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the commercial transaction or the medical decision-making that leads
to individual use. The duties of care toward the patient or consumer are
qualitatively different from any public duty owed by Health Canada as
the government regulator. 49
In a second case, Attis v. Canada(Minister of Health), two appellants
alleged that they were the recipients of faulty breast implants leading
to permanent disabilities."o The appellants claimed that Health Canada
undertook to regulate in this area and that it did so negligently. Lang J.A.,
speaking for the Court, held that when a government decides what laws
to enact or how to allocate limited resources for the general good, it has
neither a close nor direct relationship with a particular member of the
public.' The job of the government is to govern and, in the course of
doing so, make broad-based policy decisions for the benefit of the public
collectively, even if those decisions may not have positive implications
for all individuals.5 2 In dismissing the claim against Health Canada, Lang
J.A. concluded:
It would severely curtail the government's ability to govern if it were
found to have the necessary direct and close relationship to an individual
member of the public to support a claim in tort for bad government
policy decisions. It is accepted that, if the government fails to make good
decisions in these areas, the public will demonstrate its displeasure at
election time."
Health Canada's duty to the public as a whole was emphasized in 1953
when The Minister of National Health and Welfare first introduced the
FDA. He noted that, "The purpose of the bill of course is to protect the
Canadianpeople in matters of health ... The bill is concerned with the
prohibition of things that are injurious to health and that are unfit for use,
and with the prevention of deception in the manufacture and sale of goods
consumed by the public."5 4 In most cases, the courts have said that the
purpose of this legislative scheme is to facilitate the regulator's authority
to use its discretion to act in the public interest, and that the legislative
regime does not demonstrate an intent to provide for a private remedy

49. Ibid at para 33.
50. Attis v Canada (Minister ofHealth), 2008 ONCA 660, 93 OR (3d) 35 at para 4.
51. Ibid at para 65.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. House of Commons Debates, 21 at Parl, 7th Sess, Vol IV (21 April 1953) at 4141 (Hon Paul
Martin) [emphasis added].
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to individuals." It is also important to remember that Health Canada's
responsibilities extend far beyond the regulation of medical devices.
Under the FDA, Health Canada regulates among others, food, drugs and
cosmetics. As such, imposing liability on Health Canada in the context of
medical devices, and more specifically single-use medical devices, could
have a far reaching and indeterminate effect on the public purse. In Attis,
the Court found that such a "spectre of indeterminate liability, negative[s]
the imposition of government liability."56
It is noteworthy that while courts will not hold regulators liable for
policy decisions, they will attach liability to the negligent execution of a
policy decision (e.g. operational decisions in implementing the policy)." If
Health Canada has consciously decided to avoid responsibility to regulate
in this area, a failure to govern or prohibit "is a manifest policy decision."58
And so, as long as there is no champion of the regulator role, a court is
unlikely to assign regulator liability.
2. Originalmanufacturer
Original manufacturers naturally advocate against reuse, ostensibly based
on safety concerns. In 2004, the Medical Devices Association of Canada
issued a position paper in which they vehemently argued against reuse
saying, "reuse carries serious risks" and that "the manufacturer does not
guarantee the sterility, functionality or quality of the device after it has
been reprocessed."59 MEDEC's strong position is undoubtedly influenced
by the fact that manufacturers of consumable goods owe a duty of care to
the ultimate consumer of that good.6 0 In fact, manufacturers have statutory
duties to ensure that devices are fit for their intended use and may face
legal liability for preventable manufacturing defects that cause harm to
patients. Section 12 of the Medical Devices Regulations provides that:
Amedical device shall perform as intended by the manufacturer and shall
be effective for the medical conditions, purposes and uses for which it is
manufactured, sold or represented.'
Similarly, s. 13 governs the lifespan of a device and states that:
55. Drady v Canada(Minister of Health), 2008 ONCA 659, 300 DLR (4th) 443; see also Wuttunee
et al v Merck Frosst CanadaLtd et al, 2007 SKQB 29, 291 Sask R 161.
56. Supra note 50 at para 77.
57. Cooper,supra note 31 at para 38.
58. Supra note 50 at para 19 (affirming motions judge ruling).
59. Medical Devices Association of Canada, "Cause for Concern: The Reuse of Single Use
Medical Devices," Position Paper, (19 July 2004), online: <http://www.medec.org/webfm-send/894>
[MEDEC].
60. Hollis v Dow Corning Corp, [1995] 4 SCR 634 at para 20.
61. Supra note 10 at s 12.
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During the projected useful life of a medical device, its characteristics
and performance shall not deteriorate under normal use to such a degree
that the health or safety of a patient, user or other person is adversely
affected.62

A manufacturer's duty encompasses warning consumers of dangers
it knows or ought to know are inherent in the product's use. Such a duty
is a continuing one, requiring manufacturers to warn not only of dangers
known at the time of sale, but also of dangers discovered after the product
has been sold and delivered.6 3 In the case of medical products, the standard
of care to be met by manufacturers in ensuring that consumers are properly
warned is necessarily high as products that are to be "placed in the body"
have a great capacity to cause injury.64 All warnings must be reasonably
communicated, but are limited to clearly describing any specific dangers
that arise from the ordinary use of the product." Manufacturers discharge
this duty through the use of labels, advising that devices are for single use
only. Section 21(1) of the Regulationsoutlines this requirement as follows:
No person shall import or sell a medical device unless the device has a
label that sets out the following information:
(g) the expiry date of the device, if the device has one, to be determined

by the manufacturer on the basis of the component that has the shortest
projected useful life;
(h) unless self-evident to the intended user, the medical conditions,
purposes and uses for which the device is manufactured, sold or

represented, including the performance specifications of the device if
those specifications are necessary for proper use.66
Original manufacturers who label devices as single use rely on
that warning to absolve them from responsibility for harm. At least one
academic argues that reprocessing amounts to "deviation from product
labelling" and "constitutes a superseding, intervening cause and shifts all
liability to the reprocessor or re-user." 6 While it remains for a court of law
to either confirm or reject this position, labelling a device as single use is
likely to fulfill a manufacturer's informational duty to the consumer by
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
use

Ibid at s 13 [emphasis added].
Hollis, supra note 60.
Ibid at para 23.
Lambert v Lastoplex Chemicals Co, [ 1972] SCR 569 at para 574.
Supra note 10 at s 21(1) [emphasis added].
JM Hogan & TE Colonna, "Products liability implications of reprocessing and reuse of singlemedical devices." (1998) 53 Food & Drug L J 385 at 399.
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providing a warning to what is termed a "learned intermediary." This rule
applies where a consumer places primary reliance on the judgment of a
"learned intermediary" and not the manufacturer. 68 In the case of medical
devices, it is not practical to have the manufacturer warn every patient.
The learned intermediary is the healthcare professional with whom the
patient has contact.
The learned intermediary rule is likely to apply to SUDs. It has been
applied in cases where a product is highly technical in nature, is intended
to be used only under the supervision of experts, and where the nature of
the product is such that the consumer cannot not realistically receive a
direct warning from the manufacturer before using the product."0 The rule
requires that the intermediary is "learned," i.e., fully apprised of the risks
associated with the use of the product."o Accordingly, the manufacturer
can only be said to have discharged its duty to the consumer when the
intermediary's knowledge approximates that of the manufacturer. In the
case of SUDs, a label identifying a device as safe for 'single use only'
could not convey a clearer message to the intermediary.
Some commentators have suggested that an original manufacturer
bears responsibility for the foreseeable misuse of its products. Given
the research that shows widespread reuse of SUDs it is arguable that the
reprocessing of certain SUDs is foreseeable. While there is some American
jurisprudence to support this claim," this has not been the case in Canada.
In Ragoonanan v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, the Court held that it
will examine "the user's ability to perceive and avoid the risk" and that,
"where the risk of injury is not caused by a hidden danger, but an obvious
characteristic inherent in the product, and where the exercise of reasonable
care by the user can completely avoid the risk, these factors point towards
a finding of no liability."72 Similarly, in Robson v. Ashworth the Court
stated, "the concept of personal responsibility demands that those who
knowingly and deliberately misuse a useful thing ought to be aware that
the responsibility for that misuse is theirs and not that of the person who
gives it to them.""

68. Hollis, supra note 60 at para 27.
69. Ibid at para 28.
70. Ibid at para 29.
71. See Piperv Bear Med Sys, 180 Ariz 170 (Az Ct App 1993) (holding a ventilator manufacturer
liable for design defect due to reasonably foreseeable misuse by respiratory therapists, who modified
an expiratory arm by adding parts when the manufacturer was aware of this process).
72. Ragoonanan Estate v Imperial Tobacco CanadaLtd (2000), 51 OR (3d) 603 at para 124 (Sup Ct
J).
73. Robson v Ashworth (1985), 33 CCLT 229 (Ont Sup Ct HCJ).
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3. Third-partyreprocessors
A third-party reprocessor is not subject to the Regulations provided that it
does not sell medical devices under its own name or trademark. A thirdparty reprocessor might be subject to the Regulations, however, if it were
to remove the original manufacturer's trademark and rebrand the item as
its own or if it resold refurbished medical devices to hospitals other than
the one from which they originated.
A third-party reprocessor might not meet the statutory definition of
manufacturer, but could nevertheless be liable for negligence. Reprocessors
undoubtedly owe a duty of care to patients who will be treated with
devices that they have refurbished. A duty of care is imposed when "one
who brings himself into a relation with others through an activity which
foreseeably exposes them to danger if proper care is not observed, must
exercise reasonable care to safeguard them from physical injury."74
Reprocessors must ensure that their refurbishing activities are adequate
to warrant the proper functioning and cleanliness of devices intended for
reuse. As one academic notes, reprocessors have a duty "to establish and
maintain appropriate reprocessing protocols and to ensure that re-use of
the device is safe and presents no increased risk of harm or injury to the
patient above and beyond those inherent in the original use of the SUD." 5
While reprocessors emphasize that devices may be safely reused after
an appropriate refurbishing process, a patient who has suffered injury as
a result of a reused SUD will undoubtedly allege a breach of the standard
of care. Such a claim is likely to turn on the weight given to the departure
from the device's 'single-use only' labelling. It will be incumbent upon
the reprocessor to demonstrate the reasonableness of such off-label use. It
is likely that a court will hold a reprocessor to the same standard of care
required by original manufacturers. In Hollis v. Birch, the Court suggested
that the liability of a manufacturer for a defect in a breast prosthesis was
almost absolute because the prosthesis was inherently dangerous as it
was designed to be implanted in the human body.7 6 A similar logic can be
applied to SUDs. In all cases the reprocessor is aware of the possibility
of improper sterilization as well as the seriousness of the consequences
of returning a defective device to a healthcare facility. Given that all
reprocessed SUDs will come in contact with a patient, it is probable that a
court will hold a reprocessor to a very high standard of care.

74. John Fleming, The Law of Torts, 7th ed (Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 1987) at 466.
75. EP Wang, "Regulatory and legal implications of reprocessing and reuse of single-use medical
devices" (2001) 56 Food & Drug LJ 77 at 93.
76. Hollis v Birch, [1990] BCJ No 1059 (Prov. Ct.).
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4. Hospitals
The law imposes a clear obligation on hospitals to provide safe systems for
the patients to whom they provide services. It is an established principle
under Canadian law that hospitals owe a duty of care to patients to provide
proper and adequate facilities and equipment so as to reasonably ensure
patient safety." This duty of care naturally extends to the maintenance of
these facilities and equipment, which is likely to include procedures for
sterilization and the reuse of SUDs.
The off-label use of reprocessed SUDs, however, does not necessarily
constitute a failure to provide an appropriate standard of care for patients."
A hospital will be found to have breached its standard of care if it fails to
take reasonable measures to guard against foreseeable risks. In considering
a hospital's conduct in the case of SUDs, the court is likely to consider
the steps taken by the hospital to ensure that appropriate protocols are
developed and followed. Similarly, the court may also consider industry
practice by looking at the standards in place at other similar institutions.
Nonetheless, merely conforming to a pervasive practice will not
necessarily shield an institution from liability if a court finds the practice,
in and of itself, negligent. In Pitman Estate v. Bain, the Canadian Red
Cross was alleged to be negligent for their failure to adequately screen for
HIV infected blood. Lang J. held that, "the court is, of course, free to reject
that evidence of custom, if it is of the opinion that the entire industry was
negligent in adhering to the particular practice." 0
A negligence claim will also likely examine the efforts of the hospital
to ensure that its employees and medical staff follow hospital policy
regarding the reuse of SUDs. Hospitals have been found to have breached
the standard of care for failing to adopt adequate measures to ensure
that staff followed internal hospital policies." If a hospital can show,
however, that reasonable protocols have been developed and followed,
the hospital may be able to avoid liability. For example, in Parraghv.
Eagle Ridge Hospital and Health Care Centre the plaintiff alleged that
he had contracted an invasive bacterial infection as a result of negligent
sterilization procedures. 82 Expert testimony established that the hospital
77. Briffett v Gander & DistrictHospital Board et al (1992), 103 Nfid & PEIR 271 (SC (TD)); see
also E Picard & G Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto:
Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, 1996) at 379 [Picard].
78. Cherniwchan v Royal Columbian Hospital 2005 BCSC 32, 136 ACWS (3d) 762 at para 49.
79. Pittman Estate v Bain (1994), 112 DLR (4th) 257 at para 272.
80. Ibid at para 261.
81. Comeau v Saint John Regional Hospital et al, 2001 NBCA 113, 244 NBR (2d) 201.
82. Parragh v Eagle Ridge Hospital and Health Care Centre, 2008 BCSC 1299 at para 6, 170
ACWS (3d) 729.
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adopted and rigorously followed the Recommended Standards,Guidelines,
83
Thus the Court
andPositionStatementsfor RegisteredNursingPractice.
84
found it had not breached its standard of care. While the hospital in this
case met the requisite standard of care, this is likely to be a significant
hurdle for many healthcare facilities given the current practices of limited
oversight and few written policies regarding SUDs."
5. Physicians
In the vast majority of negligence cases involving a direct doctor-patient
relationship, the existence of a duty is usually conceded." As such, a
negligence claim against a physician usually begins with an examination
of the physician's standard of care, which is normally that of a reasonable
medical practitioner considering all the circumstances. To quote the Court
in Crits v. Sylvester:
Every medical practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of
skill and knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. He
is bound to exercise that degree of care and skill which could reasonably
be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same experience
and standing, and if he holds himself out as a specialist, a higher degree
of skill is required of him than of one who does not profess to be so
qualified by special training and ability."
The question is whether a healthcare professional falls below an
appropriate standard of care in using reprocessed SUDs. The position
is, perhaps, different depending on whether the physician is aware that a
specific device has been reprocessed.
The physician does not know a SUD is being used
In this scenario, the first question is whether the physician was negligent in
not knowing of the risk, determined by applying the "reasonable doctor"
standard. 8 The Supreme Court of Canada, in TerNeuzen v. Korn, noted that
a physician's standard of care "must be judged in light of the knowledge
that ought to have been reasonably possessed at the time of the alleged act
of negligence." 8 9 In assessing whether the physician ought to have known,
it is generally accepted that a court will look to the recognized practices

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Ibid at para 61.
Ibid at paras 61-68.
Polisena, supra note 6 at 6.
See for example Chasse v Evenson et al, 2006 ABQB 342, [2006] 399 AR 121 at para 8.
Crits v Sylvester, [1956] OR 132 at 143 (CA), aff'd [1956] SCR 991.
Ibid
Ter Neuzen v Korn, [1995] 3 SCR 674 at para 34.
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of the profession. 90 There are, however, situations where the standard
practice itself may be found negligent if the standard practice is "fraught
with obvious risks" such that anyone is capable of finding it negligent
(regardless of their expertise in the particular area).9' In this scenario,
where the standard practice would be the reuse of devices labelled singleuse without informing the physician, it is arguable that such a custom is
fraught with such obvious risks that the court would not defer to clinical
expertise on the matter.
Despite the recommendations and guidance documents in existence
from various healthcare organizations and provincial authorities, all of
which recommend that a written reuse policy be in place, it is uncertain as
to whether physicians could escape liability by claiming that they do not
know they are using a reprocessed SUD. Most "best practice" documents
and advisory bulletins are clear in advocating the importance of tracking
SUDs throughout their use and reuse.9 2 Practically speaking, given the
conflicting reports on the safety of reprocessing SUDs, a court is apt to
expect a healthcare professional to know when an SUD device is being
used and when one is not.
The jurisprudence suggests that failure to adopt alternative measures
even in the face of prevailing practice among practitioners may be found
to be negligent.93 In Anderson v. Chasney, a physician performed throat
surgery on a child.9 4 During the surgery, sponges were used without any
tape or strings attached to ensure that none was left in the throat and a nurse
was not present to count the number of sponges used. One of the sponges
was inadvertently left in the throat, and after the operation the child died
of suffocation. At the time, the impugned practice was standard practice
in hospitals. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that the surgeon acted
negligently. An analogy might be drawn between this case and the practice
of physicians not considering the use of SUDs in their practices.
Even if a plaintiff fails to establish that the reuse of a SUD is a plain
and obvious risk, a physician may still be found liable. Where a physician
has or ought to have knowledge of a particular risk, the standard of care is
also raised. The need for greater vigilance in these situations was affirmed
in Rietze v. Bruser9 In that case, the Court held that the nature of the
procedure or the patient's condition may require the physician to meet
90. Ibid at para 33.
91. Ibid atpara 41.
92. See for example supra notes 25-28.
93. Ter Neuzen, supra note 89 at para 44.
94. Anderson v Chasney et al, [1949] 4 DLR 71 (Man CA), aff'd [1950] 4 DLR 223 (SCC).
95. Rietze v Bruser et al, [1979] 1 WWR 31 (Man QB).
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a higher standard of care. Thus, a court may find that a physician ought
to know that an SUD is going to be reused because the very nature of
reusing SUDs imposes a heightened risk of infection. In turn, a court may
impose a higher standard of care on physicians to be more vigilant for
such things as infectious disease stemming from the use of a reprocessed
SUD. For example, in the context of post-operative care, prescribing drugs
to minimize or avert an adverse effect (e.g. infection) stemming from the
use of a reprocessed drill bit in a hip replacement, might be the requisite
standard of care.
Conversely, there is some jurisprudence to suggest that if physicians
are not made aware of certain risks, by no fault of their own, the court
will be reluctant to find a breach of the standard of care. In Kovacich v.
St Joseph ' Hospital, a patient contracted a potentially life-threatening
Streptococcus A infection after surgery.96 The hospital's Infection Control
Committee had been aware that there were similar incidences occurring in
the community but this information was not forwarded to the physicians.
The patient plaintiff alleged that had this information been disclosed
he would not have had the surgery. The Court held that "there was no
reason given the personal knowledge of the two doctors.. .to disclose the
phenomena of Streptococcus A infection and necrotizing fasciitis as a

risk." 9 7
Assessing whether a physician has fallen below the standard of care in
not knowing when a SUD is being reused is highly case specific and fact
dependent. This speaks to the importance of having a clear system in place
so that healthcare providers are mindful of which devices are being reused
and any increased risks associated with that reuse. If a court concludes
that a reasonable physician would have known of the risk or ought to
have known of the risk, the physician will be found to have breached their
standard of care for failing to apprise themselves of the risk.

96. Kovacich v St Joseph &Hospital(2004), 134 ACWS (3d) 917.
97. Ibid at para 143.
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The physician knows that an SUD is being reused but does not disclose
this to the patient98
It is well known that, except in very limited circumstances, patients must
give their informed consent before any treatment can be lawfully provided
to them."9 For consent to be legally valid, it must be given voluntarily
by a competent person who has been fully informed of the nature of
the treatment and its relevant risks and benefits. The primary question
is whether the patient has been sufficiently informed of any risks of the
procedure which would influence a decision.
The leading Canadian decision with respect to informed consent is
Reibl v. Hughes.'00 Although a physician is not required to inform a patient
of every single risk associated with a procedure, the physician is obligated
0 The analysis of what
to disclose any material, special or unusual risks.o'
constitutes a material risk includes considerations of the likelihood of the
occurrence of a risk and the gravity of the potential consequences. Chief
Justice Laskin held in Reibl that even if a risk is a mere possibility, it must
be disclosed if its occurrence carries serious consequences (e.g. paralysis,
death).o 2
Since the decision in Reibl, the courts have adopted an expansive
view of a patient's reasonable right to know, construing the language of
"material, special or unusual risk" liberally.'03 That is, courts place little
emphasis on how the risk is characterized, preferring to focus on whether
a reasonable person in the patient's position would want to know.' "
If the physician (or hospital) can establish that there is no increase in the
level of risk associated with the reused device, the court should find that it
is reasonable to proceed on the basis that there is no need to obtain specific
informed consent to the reuse of an SUD. 0 One commentator points out
that "[t]he consent process is a communication between the patient and

98. While the duty of disclosure rests primarily with the practitioner who plans to carry out the
proposed treatment, there is some case law which suggests the hospitals have an independent, nondelegable duty to ensure that informed consent is obtained from patients prior to medical treatment:
see LaChambre v Nair, [1989] 2 WWR 749, 74 Sask R 87, (QB). While the non-delegable nature of
this duty has been subject to comment (see E Picard & G Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and
Hospitals in Canada,3d ed (Toronto: Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, 1996) at 146-47),
hospitals should operate on the basis that they have a duty to put systems in place, such as protocols
and proper procedures designed to ensure informed consent.
99. Arndt v Smith, [1997] 2 SCR 539 at paras 45-55.
100. Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880.
101. Ibid at884.
102. Ibid at 885.
103. Picard, supra note 77 at 128.
104. Reibl, supra note 100 at 899.
105. Wang, supra note 75 at 95.
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physician about the procedure itself, not the instrumentation."' 06 Typically,
"surgeons do not confer with patients preoperatively to discuss whether a
hook, electrosurgical instrument or a spatula will be used to remove the
gallbladder during a laparoscopic cholecystectomy."'0 o
Alternatively, it is open to argue that patients entering a healthcare
facility have assumptions about the care they are likely to receiveassumptions that undoubtedly include being treated with their own and
not some set of refurbished devices. Therefore, it might be possible for
a patient to claim that whether the medical equipment to be used in his
treatment was reused was of material importance. Some commentators
agree that a patient has the right to know if a reprocessed SUD will be
used, and that they have a concomitant right to refuse treatment unless a
new device is used:
It is safe to assume that most patients prefer the procedure or surgery to
be performed with the lowest possible risk. By inference, most patients
would not want to increase their risks unnecessarily by allowing reused medical devices to be used on them when that device was not
manufactured, marketed or approved for more than a single use.10
Another academic adds that where a hospital or physician has a policy
with respect to reusing devices, patients should be informed of this.'"0
In the absence of specific regulations governing the use of reprocessed
SUDs, healthcare providers cannot turn to regulatory rules to determine
what, if any, information must be disclosed to a patient to meet informed
consent requirements. Ultimately, an obligation to disclose reuse activities
will depend on several factors some of which will undoubtedly include: (1)
the SUD in question; (2) scientific evidence about its reuse; (3) the relative
risk associated with reprocessed SUDs in comparison to alternatives; and
(4) whether reprocessing and reuse protocols contribute to significant
increases in risk to the patient."i0 If the evidence indicates an increased
risk of harm, healthcare providers may have a legal obligation to disclose
this information to a patient before treatment.

106. M Parsons, "The Dilemma Over the Reuse of 'Single-Use' Medical Devices: A Risk Manager's
Perspective" (1997) 19:3 Todays Surg Nurse 17 at 18.
107. D Dunn, "Reprocessing Single-use Devices: The Ethical Dilemma" (2002) 75 AORN J 989 at
992.
108. D Carey, "Reprocessing and Reusing Single-use Only Medical Devices: Safe Medical Practice
or Risky Business?" (2001) 17 J Contemp Health Law Policy 657 at 672.
109. B Dickens, "Legal Issues surrounding reuse of Disposable Medical Device: Medical Device
Liability New Regulations, New Concerns" in Proceedings of the Fourth CCOHTA Regional
Symposium (Ottawa: Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment, 1995).
110. Wang, supra note 75 at 95. See also Hogan, supranote 67 at 398.

If it's Reusable Why not Reuse it?

251

III. The internationalregulatoryenvironment
The international position on the reuse of SUDs is generally as varied and
muddied as that of Canada. Some countries, however, have developed
clear positions respecting the use of SUDs.
1. United States
In contrast to Health Canada's position, the United States Food and
Drugs Administration has taken the position that hospitals and thirdparties engaged in reprocessing SUDs will be subject to all the regulatory
requirements currently applicable to original equipment manufacturers
including pre-market submission requirements."' All regulatory requirements for these parties were fully implemented (via the Medical Device
User Fee and ModernizationAct, 2002), 112and include a registration and
listing scheme for reprocessors, inspections under the Quality System
Regulations, labelling, adverse event reporting, corrections and removals,
pre-market clearance as well as tracking requirements."'
2. Australia
Like the United States, there is a national regulatory framework. It was
introduced in 2003 by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration.
Under this regulatory scheme, when an SUD undergoes reprocessing it is
defined as "re-manufactured" for the purpose of reuse, and so the intended
purpose and design specifications for the device are considered to be
altered from single-use to reusable. The person responsible for undertaking
the reprocessing is considered to be a manufacturer and must comply with
the therapeutic goods legislation relating to the manufacturing of medical
devices. 114
3. UnitedKingdom
Although the United Kingdom has not issued a regulatory ban, a
strong statement against the practice has been issued by the Medicines
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). An October
2006 bulletin, entitled "Single-use Medical Devices: Implications and
Consequences of Reuse" highlights the hazards and risks associated with

111.US, Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for
Devices and Radiological Health, Guidancefor Industry and FDA staff. Enforcement Prioritiesfor
Single-Use Devices Reprocessed by Third-Partiesand Hospitals (14 August 2000), online: <http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCMI 07164.
htm>.
112. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act, Pub L No 107-250, 116 Stat 1588 (2002).
113. US Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for
Devices and Radiological Health, Notice re: Reuse of Single Use Devices.
114. Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth).
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reprocessing and reusing single-use medical devices, and outlines the
legal issues associated for such actions. The MHRA makes it clear in this
document that, "devices designated for 'single-use' must not be reused
under any circumstances.""5

4. European Union
The legal framework for medical devices comprises three Directives;
the 1990 Directive on Active Implantable Medical Devices,"' the 1993
Directive Concerning Medical Devices,"' which is the main directive,
and the 1998 Directive on In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices."' Use
of a device outside its original specifications, however, is not covered by
the Directives. This, in turn, leaves no clear guidance with respect to the
reuse of single-use devices. In 2003, the European Council published the
"Report on the health implications of council directive 93/42/EEC of 14
June 1993 concerning medical devices." The report acknowledges that the
reprocessing of single-use medical devices is not banned by the Directives,
but urges member states to take the necessary measures to ensure that
single-use devices are not reused "as the reuse of medical devices intended
for single-use only poses a risk for patients and hospital staff."l 9 Many
European countries have, in fact, taken positions with respect to reuse
activities.
France, for example, has implemented an outright ban on all reuse
activity,12 0 while Germany provides for a strict documentation and
validation process for reused SUDs, requiring proof from the reprocessor
that the reprocessing procedure is safe for patients, users and other third
parties.' 2' As well as imposing conditions on the design of SUDs, Sweden
requires hospitals to obtain a patient's informed consent to their use.

115. UK, Department of Health, Device Bulletin DB2006(04), "Single-use Medical Devices:
Implications and Consequences of Reuse" (October 2006).
116. EC, Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to active implantable medical devices, [1990] OJ, L 189/1.
117. EC, Council Directive 93/42/EEC as of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, [1993] OJ, L
169/1.
118. EC, Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and ofthe council of27 October 1998 on in
vitro diagnostic medical devices, [ 1998] OJ, L 33 1/1.
119. Eucomed, "Manifesto calling for EU regulation of all reprocessing of single use medical devices:
final adoption by Eucomed and five stakeholders in healthcare." Press release (March 2003, Brussels)
online: CPME <http://www/cpme.be/news_press.php?id=8>.
120. Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise, Art R 711-1.16.b.
121. MHRA Device Bulletin: Single use medical Devices: Implications and consequences of
Reuse - DB2006(4) - October 2006, online: <http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Publications/Safetyguidance/
DeviceBulletins/CON2024995 >.
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IV. A recommended approach
Without a regulatory regime regarding SUDs that provides standards,
compliance provisions, and enforcement penalties, there is only a reactive
tort compensation scheme that does not directly ensure the safety of SUDs.
I outline three approaches to the current problem of unregulated SUDs and
discuss the benefits and difficulties that flow from each alternative.
1. Option one: Maintain the status quo-encourageprovinces and
territoriesto develop their own regulatory solutions
Health Canada could play a supportive role in helping the provinces and
territories devise their own solutions for this issue. Such solutions could
involve regulations incorporating mandatory standards. This alternative
would be less costly for Health Canada and the provinces would have
some autonomy to determine what solution was best-suited to their needs
and their existing regulatory systems.
As is already the case, some provinces have chosen to establish
or maintain voluntary standards (e.g. guidelines), while others have
implemented regulatory standards. This has resulted in SUDs being held
to different standards depending on the jurisdiction. Such a piecemeal
approach has the potential to create a hodgepodge ofjurisprudence spanning
the country. Eucomed (European Association of Medical Device Suppliers)
notes the importance of having "national policies and legislation on the
reprocessing of single-use medical devices by reprocessors, hospitals,
original manufacturers and medical practitioners." 22 Maintaining a
provincial approach to reuse activity affects the health of Canadians by
subjecting them to a geographical lottery. Depending on where a patient
resides, they may never be subject to reprocessed SUDs, they may be
subject to reprocessed SUDs that are required to comply with rigorous
standards, or they may be subject to reprocessed SUDs in a province that
does not provide any direction on reuse.
2. Option two: Attempt to ban the reuse of all single-use devices
In light of the potential health risks posed by the practice, it may be in the
best interests of patients for Health Canada to do what several European
countries have done, which is prohibit reuse of any device that is labelled
by the manufacturer as being intended for single use only. This option
would eliminate the need to develop and maintain regulations, safety
standards and quality assurance systems for reprocessing single-use
devices. Given the serious cost implications associated with having to buy
new devices for every procedure, some researchers suggest that Manitoba's
122. Supra note 119.
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ban on the reuse of just critical care disposables has an estimated cost of
an additional four million dollars per year. 1 23 When considering the cost
implications, it is important to consider what effects such a ban would
have on hospitals if the ban were to be implemented without additional
funding. Would a hospital be forced to perform fewer procedures? Where
else might the hospital cut funds? The answers to both these questions
could have important implications for patients.
3. Option three: amend the Medical Devices Regulations to include the
activities of reprocessors
While Health Canada may not be able to regulate the use of SUDs in the
traditional sense, it is open for them to subject reprocessing activities in
and of themselves to the Regulations. I would postulate that the origins of
this sovereign power include federal authority under s. 91 of the British
North America Act in respect of criminal law, trade and commerce, and
in the residual power to legislate in the areas of peace, order and good
government.
A lengthy constitutional division of powers analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, but support for this contention is briefly outlined. First,
the criminal power has been held to extend to those laws that are designed
to promote public peace, safety, order, health or other legitimate public
purpose.124 In Labatt Breweries, the Court held that a health hazard may
ground a criminal prohibition,125 while inR. v. Hydro Quebec, the Court held
that "parliament has for long exercised extensive control over such matters
as food and drugs by prohibitions grounded in the criminal law power." 26
Second, the federal power to regulate in the area of trade and commerce is
said to include matters of "trade affecting the whole dominion.""2 The test
in determining whether the trade and commerce head applies is whether
the issue is "a question of general interest throughout the Dominion." 28
The reprocessing, distribution and reuse of SUDs are undoubtedly matters
having an impact on the country as a whole, and which can only be dealt
with on an integrated national basis. Finally, it has been held that the
residual powers of Parliament to legislate in the areas of peace, order and
good government (POGG) apply in the context of health.12 9 The POGG
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power is said to apply where the subject matter "goes beyond local or
provincial concern and must, from its inherent nature, be of the concern of
the Dominion as a whole.""'o
The importance of having a national policy with respect to the reuse
of SUDs is paramount. This is a national concern that cannot realistically
be satisfied by cooperative provincial action because the failure of one
province to cooperate would carry with it grave consequences for the
residents, and any visitors, to that province. The nature of SUD reuse
has the necessary national dimension to justify the invocation of national
regulations.
As has been done in the United States and Australia, Health Canada
should amend the Medical Devices Regulations to subject reprocessors
to the same standards as an original manufacturer. Reprocessors should
be required to comply with the same quality system requirements, audits,
inspections, and the same mandatory problem reporting as the original
manufacturer. As a result, this would provide increased safety to patients
by ensuring that reprocessing is done according to established standards
and regulatory control.
There are two ways to accomplish this objective. The US approach
was to enact the Medical Device UserFee and ModernizationAct of 2002
(MDUFMA),'" which amends sections of the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FD&CA) to include definitions for "single use device"
and "reprocessed."' 32 The MDUFMA then adds a section to the FD&CA
which reads:
(1) With respect to reprocessed single-use devices for which reports are
required under subsection (k):
(A) ... [onus is on reprocessors to] ensure that the device is substantially
equivalent to a predicate device, including validation data, cleaning and
sterilization, and functional performance demonstrating that the singleuse device will remain substantially equivalent to its predicate device
after the maximum number of times the device is reprocessed as intended
by the person submitting the premarket notification.'
The MDUFMA also makes it easier for patients and health care
professionals to know when they are using a reprocessed device. The
labelling requirements necessitate that reprocessed single-use devices
prominently and conspicuously bear the statement:
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Reprocessed device for single use. Reprocessed by [name ofmanufacturer
that reprocessed the device].' 34
This provision is intended to limit any liability attaching to the original
manufacturer for a defect or adverse effect resulting from the reuse of SUDs.
This seems like a logical place to allocate the legal risks associated with
reuse. Canada's Medical Devices Technology Companies (MEDEC) have
long advocated for such an approach suggesting that, "they [reprocessors]
should be forced to remove the name and any distinguishing trademarks of
the original manufacturer from the device and assume full responsibility
for the device."' 35
The enactment of a similar labelling provision in Canada would solve
some of the informed consent issues mentioned earlier. First, it ensures
that healthcare professionals are themselves informed when a device
is reused. Second, by having a system in place that requires devices be
tested and approved as safe for reuse renders any debate over disclosure
unnecessary; any device being reused would, by law, pose no greater risk
than their new counter-parts.
While the result of the Australian framework is the same-reprocessors
are subject to the same requirements as original manufacturers-they take a
more direct approach. The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 has been amended
to include those who refurbish medical devices within the meaning of a
"manufacturer." Section 41BG reads:
(2) The manufacturer of the device is the person who does one or more
of the following using ready-made products:
(d) fully refurbishes the device' 36
Both of these approaches are successful in requiring any party
who endeavours to reprocess to not only be licensed to do so, but also
to demonstrate that their devices are safe for reuse before any of their
reprocessed devices are allowed to be used on patients. If a hospital or a
third-party can show that they are able to reprocess a single-use device
and restore its original specifications without increasing the risk to patient
safety, there is no obvious reason to prohibit such an activity. While some
may argue that this approach will likely be difficult to implement, it is
important to note that it involves little in the way of legislative amendment
134. Supra note 112 § 302(a)(1).
135. Supra note 59 at 9.
136. Supra note l14 at s 41BG.
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and could piggy-back the same licensing and compliance enforcement
system already in place for original manufacturers.
What is certain is that by subjecting reprocessors to the same standards
as original manufacturers, there is a strong incentive to develop sound
reuse practices. Contravention of the Food and Drugs Act or the Medical
Devices Regulations can result in both hefty fines and substantial jail
time. In addition, reprocessors could lose their medical devices license.
While one would like to think that the potential to inflict harm would be
enough to convince reprocessors to develop rigorous standards, the reality
is that this may not be the case. Without regulation, one might find it more
economical to run the risk of having to pay an injured claimant than to
implement the testing procedures required to ensure the safety of their
reprocessed devices. However, the imposition of jail time or the loss of a
license is likely to discourage unsafe practices.
It is important to remember that labelling a device as single use is at
the sole discretion of manufacturers; all the label means is that the device
has not been tested as safe for reuse. While some medical devices are
likely never to be safe for reuse (e.g. needles), there is some suggestion
from the American courts that manufacturers often label a device single
use solely to (a) avoid the testing costs inherent in labelling a device as
safe for multiple uses; (b) to increase revenue by selling more units; and
(c) to attempt to avoid liability. 37 This may mean that many items currently
labelled single use could be just as safe as their reusable counterparts.
Reprocessors should be encouraged to develop refurbishing schemes that
are safe and effective in returning devices to their original forms. It not only
helps eliminate biomedical waste, but provides a disincentive to original
manufacturers to label a device as single use without it being necessary;
if a manufacturer labels devices as single use with the intent to profit on
increased sales, they are not likely to cash in on such a tactic if hospitals
are prepared to refurbish devices labelled as single use.
Thus while it is likely that an injured patient would have recourse
through the tort system, litigation presents many uncertainties and
challenges for a potential plaintiff. The implementation of a regulatory
system, while not precluding a claim in tort, is a proactive approach that
works to lessen the chance of patient injury from improperly reprocessed
SUDs by placing a bigger burden on reprocessors.
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Conclusion
Reuse of SUDs has been touted as an important cost-saving strategy in
response to escalating healthcare costs, and continues to be common
practice in the healthcare community.' Until courts or regulators decide
otherwise, many legal questions with respect to this practice remain
unanswered. As such, those who are involved in reprocessing devices
labelled as "single use only" need to carefully consider the potential for
legal liability associated with reuse activities. Similarly, any economic
benefits stemming from reuse must be weighed in light of the health
risks associated with the reusing of SUDs. While a blanket policy against
reuse may be risk adverse, it is not cost effective or practical. Patient risks
and institutional liabilities would be best served if Parliament were to
amend the Medical Devices Regulations to include reprocessing within
the definition of manufacturing. By subjecting reprocessors to the same
requirements as an original manufacturer, there will be a structured set of
expectations for those involved in the reprocessing practice and national
consistency in terms of patient care.
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